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Abstract
We examine a duopoly with polluting production where rms adopt
a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to dene their objective
functions. Our analysis focusses on the bearings of CSR on collusion
over an innite horizon, sustained by either grim trigger strategies or
optimal punishments. Our results suggest that assigning a weight to
consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect under both full and par-
tial collusion. Conversely, a higher impact of productivity on pollution
has an anti-competitive e¤ect under partial collusion, while exerting no
e¤ect under full collusion. Under partial collusion, the analysis of the
isoquant map of the cartel reveals that complementarity arises between
the two weights.
JEL codes: H23, L13, L41.
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1 Introduction
A growing interest for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is recently
characterising the economic literature.1 One strand identies CSR with cre-
ation of public goods or curtailment of public bads (Bagnoli andWatts, 2003,
Kotchen, 2006, Besley and Ghatak, 2010), generally showing that there is
a close parallel between CSR so dened and the results obtained by the
models of private provision of public goods. Other contributes study the
desirability of CSR (Baron, 2001), the role of CSR in selecting motivated
agents (Brekke and Nyborg, 2005) or the rm competition in the presence
of green consumers (Arora and Gangopdhyay, 1995 and Garcia-Gallego
and Georgantzís, 2009) or social pressure (Baron, 2009). Finally, Lundgren
(2007), Lambertini and Tampieri (2010) and Manasakis et al. (2011) study
the presence of a CSR rm in an oligopoly, and Lambertini and Tampieri
(2011) examine the market stability in mixed oligopoly with CSR rms.
The presence of CSR is viewed by its supporters as a self-regulating
tool, as it leads rms to internalise the environmental e¤ects caused by
production. The question we address in this paper is whether the adoption
of CSR has an impact on rms ability to collude. A priori, CSR may have
ambiguous welfare implications, since an output restriction driven by a CSR
mandate shrinks the external e¤ects but obviously intensies collusion, the
balance between the negative price e¤ect and the positive environmental
e¤ect being unclear.
We model a duopoly supergame where production pollutes the environ-
ment, rms follow rules of Corporate Social Responsibility and compete à la
Cournot. We dene as CSR a rm that takes into account not only its prof-
its but also internalises its own share of the externality and is sensitive to
consumerswelfare. We examine both full and partial collusion using alter-
1For an overview, see Benabou and Tirole, 2010. For a series of articles on non-market
strategy in the form of Corportate Social Responsibility, see the volume 16, issue 3 of the
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007. For some empirical contribution,
Chatterji et al. (2009) analyse the e¤ectiveness of social ratings as a measure of CSR,
while Fernández-Kranz and Santaló (2010) test whether Corporate Social Responsibility
is driven by strategic considerations by empirically studying the link between competition
and rmssocial performance.
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natively the punishment based on Friedmans (1971) grim trigger strategies
and Abreus (1986) optimal punishments.
Our results suggest that, irrespective of the specic nature of punish-
ment, to assign a weight to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect
both in full and partial collusion. Also, a higher impact of productivity on
pollution has a pro-competitive e¤ect in partial collusion, and no e¤ect in
full collusion.2 We complement the analysis of cartel behaviour with a wel-
fare appraisal based on the shape of the isoquant map associated with both
types of punishment, nding out that the weights attached to the externality
and consumer surplus are complements over the entire parameter range.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and the solution in full collusion. Section 3 analyses full and partial
collusion, respectively, with grim trigger strategies. Section 4 examines full
and partial collusion with optimal punishments. The welfare implications
are illustrated in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a supergame taking place over discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; ::; during
which rms 1 and 2 compete à la Cournot and supply a homogeneous good,
whose market demand function is p = a q1 q2; a being a positive constant
parameter measuring the reservation price and q1 and q2 being the quantity
produced by rm 1 and 2, respectively. In each period t, production takes
place at constant returns to scale with a marginal cost c 2 (0; a), common
to both rms and time-invariant. Hence, the per-period individual rms
prot function is i = (p   c)qi; i 2 f1; 2g : Throughout the supergame,
rms share the same time preferences, measured by the constant discount
factor  2 (0; 1). The production of the nal output entails a negative
2To the best of our knowledge, there exists two contributions loosely related to our dis-
cussion, although neither incorporate CSR. The rst is Damania (1996), using a Cournot
supergame to show that rmsprotability is enhanced by environmental taxation. The
second is Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), where the pro-competitive e¤ects of a minimum
quality standard regulation are illustrated in a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly where
rms collude in prices.
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environmental externality E = q1 + q2. For simplicity, we assume that E
does not accumulate over time.3 Consumer surplus is measured by CS =
(q1 + q2)
2 =2. The resulting social welfare function is
SW = 1 + 2 + CS   E: (1)
We assume rms follow rules of Corporate Social Responsibility. Oligopolies
where all rm embrace CSR rules are common in the real world: an ex-
ample is the energy market in Italy. According to the European Union
Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility,4 CSR companies integrate so-
cial and environmental concerns in their business operations. Within the
company, socially responsible practices primarily involve employees and re-
late to issues such as investing in human capital, health and safety, and
managing change, while environmentally responsible practices relate mainly
to the management of natural resources used in the production. Out of the
company, CSR practices involve a wide range of stakeholders: business part-
ners and suppliers, customers, public authorities and local communities, as
well as the environment. Thus we need to assume a specic CSR objective
structure. In this, we borrow from Lambertini and Tampieri (2010): for the
environmental concern, we assume that the CSR rm internalises its own
share of pollution. All the other social concerns can be interpreted in our
model as part of consumer surplus, hence we assume that the CSR rm is
sensitive to it. Thus the CSR objective function is:
~i = i   gqi + z (q1 + q2)
2
2
; for all i 2 f1; 2g ; (2)
where z 2 [0; 1] denotes the weight that rm i assigns to consumer surplus,
and g 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of environmental awareness of the rm.
For simplicity, we assume z is common to both rms. Also, we assume that
a > c + g in order to ensure that the Cournot equilibrium quantities are
3This would turn our setup into a proper dynamic game with a state (the stock of pollu-
tion) evolving over time. There exists a large literature in this vein (see, e.g., Bencheckroun
and Long, 1998; 2002; and Dockner et al., 2000, ch. 12).
4See www.mallenbaker.net/csr/denition.php.
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positive.
3 Grim trigger strategies
In this section we examine the standard solution of a supergame where devi-
ations from the cartel path are deterred by grim trigger strategies (Friedman,
1971), i.e., after any defection rms revert forever to the Nash equilibrium
of the constituent game.
3.1 Full collusion
To begin with, we examine the equilibrium in the case of full collusion, that
is, we analyse the existence of a collusive subgame perfect equilibrium where
the two rms jointly solve the following problem:
max
q1;q2
e = ~1 + ~2 (3)
yielding:
q =
a  c  g
4 (1  z) ; (4)
~i =
(a  c  g)2
8 (1  z) : (5)
A unilateral deviation q along ones own best reply function yields the
following outcome:
qD =
3 (a  c  g)
4 (2  z) ; q
 =
a  c  g
4 (1  z) ; (6)
~D =
(a  c  g)2 [9  8z (2  z)]
32 (2  z) (1  z)2 ; (7)
~CH =
(a  c  g)2 [12  z (13 + 8z (1  z))]
32 (2  3z + z2)2 ; (8)
where the superscripts D and CH stand for deviating and cheated,
respectively. Finally, Cournot-Nash non-cooperative behaviour entails the
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following outputs and payo¤s:
qN =
a  c  g
3  2z ; (9)
~N =
(a  c  g)2
(3  2z)2 ; (10)
whereN stands for Nash equilibrium. Simple algebra shows that ~D > ~;
~N > ~CH and ~ > ~N : Therefore, the constituent game is indeed a
prisoners dilemma.
The condition for the stability of full collusion under grim trigger strate-
gies is:
~
1    ~
D +
~N
1   ; (11)
that is met by all
   = ~
D   ~
~D   ~N =
(3  2z)2
17  8z (3  z) :
By deriving  w.r.t. z, we obtain
@
@z
=
4 (3  2z)
[17  8z (3  z)]2 > 0:
Hence an increase in the rms sensitivity to consumer surplus increases
the critical threshold of the discount factor allowing for full collusion. This
implies:
Lemma 1 Under full collusion, increasing the weight attached to consumer
surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect.
On the other hand, since @=@g = 0; internalising the environmental
externality has no e¤ect whatsoever on the sustainability of collusion.
3.2 Partial collusion
In the case that the discount factor is too high to allow full collusion, rms
may nonetheless activate the highest degree of partial collusion compatible
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with their intertemporal preferences, rather than revert to Cournot-Nash
competition. I.e., rms have to identify the lowest collusive quantity qC ;
given a generic discount factor  < .
Setting q1 = q2 = qC ; we may write the symmetric collusive payo¤
accruing to each rm as
~C = qC

a  c  g   2qC (1  z) : (12)
The unilateral deviation along the best reply function yields:
qDP =
a  c  g   qC (1  z)
2  z ; (13)
~DP =
 
a  c  g   qC2 + 2qCz (a  c  g)
2 (2  z) ; (14)
~CHP =
 
a  c  g + qC2 z
2 (2  z)2 +
qC

(a  c) (1  z)  g + qC
2  z   gq
C ; (15)
where the meaning of superscripts is intuitive. The intensity of partial col-
lusion is measured by the minimum level of qC satisfying the inequality:
~CP
1    ~
DP +
~N
1   ; (16)
that gives:
qC 2
24max
0@(a  c  g)
h

 
4z2   10z + 52   (3  2z)2ih
   (3  2z)2
i
(3  2z)
;
a  c  g
4 (1  z)
1A ; a  c  g
3  2z
35 ;
(17)
with
(a  c  g)
h

 
4z2   10z + 52   (3  2z)2ih
   (3  2z)2
i
(3  2z)
>
a  c  g
4 (1  z) 8  < 
: (18)
Accordingly, for any  2 (0; ) ; the most intense level of collusion takes
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place at
bqCN = (a  c  g)
h

 
4z2   10z + 52   (3  2z)2ih
   (3  2z)2
i
(3  2z)
(19)
with subscript N denoting the Nash reversion. We are now in a position to
analyse the relationship between bqCN and both the sensitivity to consumer
surplus, z, and the impact of productivity on pollution, g. The partial
derivative of bqCN w.r.t. z yields:
@bqCN
@z
=
2 (a  c  g)
h
(3  2z)4   22  2z2   6z + 5   (3  2z)2  4z2   8z   1ih
   (3  2z)2
i2
(3  2z)2
:
(20)
To evaluate its sign, note rst that 2z2   6z + 5 > 0 for all z 2 [0; 1] :
Moreover, the denominator of the above fraction is positive. Hence, @bqCN=@z
is concave in ; with @bqCN=@z = 0 at
 =
(3  2z)2

1 + 8z   4z2 p41  32z + 72z2   64z3 + 16z4

4(5  6z + 2z2) (21)
with   < 0 and + > 1 always. This proves that @bqCN=@z > 0 over the
entire admissible region of parameters f; zg :
Lemma 2 Under partial collusion, increasing the weight attached to con-
sumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect.
We turn now to the analysis of the impact of g on collusion. The partial
derivative of bqCN w.r.t. g yields:
@bqCN
@g
=
(3  2z)2     4z2   10z + 5
(3  2z)

   (3  2z)2
 : (22)
Since the denominator is surely negative, any z 2 ((5 p5)=4; 1) su¢ ces to
yield @bqCN=@g < 0: Otherwise, for all z 2  0; (5 p5)=4 ; we have @bqCN=@g ?
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0 for all  ? (3  2z)2 =  4z2   10z + 5 : However,
(3  2z)2
4z2   10z + 5 > 
 8 z 2
 
0;
5 p5
4
!
: (23)
Consequently, @bqCN=@g < 0 over the entire admissible region of parameters
f; zg :
Lemma 3 Under partial collusion, internalising the environmental exter-
nality has an anti-competitive e¤ect.
The intuition is clear. Both taking into account the environmental ex-
ternality and colluding leads to a reduction of the output produced.
4 Optimal punishments
In this section we analyse Abreus (1986, 1988) one-shot optimal punish-
ments in the CSR duopoly, both for full and partial collusion. The stability
of collusion and the implementability of the penal code require, respectively
(see Abreu, 1986, Lemma 17, p. 204):
~D   ~    ~   ~OP  ; (24)
~DOP   ~OP    ~   ~OP  ; (25)
where ~OP denotes each rms stage payo¤when both rms play the optimal
punishment qOP , i.e.:
~OP = qOP

a  c  g + 2qOP (1  z) ; (26)
whilst ~DOP is the payo¤ from a one-shot best response against qOP , i.e.:
~DOP =
 
a  c  g   qOP 2 + 2qOP z (a  c  g)
2 (2  z) : (27)
A third constraint must be taken into account, i.e., the so-called security
level, stating that the discounted continuation payo¤ from the punishment
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period onwards must be non-negative in order for rms not to quit the
supergame:
~OP + ~
1X
t=1
t  0: (28)
4.1 Full collusion
We start from the case with full collusion. By solving the system (24-25),
we obtain:
qOP =
(a  c  g) (5  6z)
4 (2z2   5z + 3) ; (29)
OP =
(3  2z)2
16 (z2   3z + 2) : (30)
The denominator of (29) is positive for all z 2 [0; 1], so that qOP > 0 for all
z < 5=6:
Now we have to check whether (28) is satised. Given qi = qOP ,  =
OP ; and for all z 2 [0; 5=6), each rms discounted prot ow from the
punishment period onwards is:
~OP +
1X
t=1
 
OP
t
~ =
(a  c  g)2 [49  4z (19 + z (9  8z (3  z)))]
2 (1  z) (3  2z)2 (12z2   36z + 23) : (31)
To evaluate its positivity, note rst that the numerator is always positive
since (a  c  g)2 > 0 and 49   4z (19 + z (9  8z (3  z))) > 0 for all z 2
[0; 1] : Moreover, 12z2   36z + 23 > 0 for all z 2 0;  9  2p3 =6 ; where 
9  2p3 =6 > 5=6: Therefore the security level condition is slack for all
z 2 [0; 5=6) :
We can now control how the sensitivity of consumer surplus a¤ects col-
lusion. By deriving OP w.r.t. z, we obtain
@OP
@z
=
(3  2z)
16 (z2   3z + 2)2 > 0: (32)
Therefore, even with optimal punishment, an increase in the sensitivity to
consumer surplus increases the minimum discount factor allowing for full
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collusion.
For all z 2 [5=6; 1) we have qOP = 0, so that we obtain two values of
OP from (24-25), i.e.:
OP1 =
(1  2z)2
4 (z2   3z + 2) _ 
OP
2 =
4 (1  z)
2  z : (33)
Collusion is feasible for all  > max

OP1 ; 
OP
2
	
: Simple algebra shows that
OP1 > 
OP
2 for all z > 5=6; so that collusion is feasible for all  > 
OP
1 . Also
within the range z 2 (5=6; 7=8) ; we have  < 1. For all z 2 (7=8; 1), since
  1 collusion is impossible. Hence we can say that:5
Lemma 4 Under optimal punishment and full collusion, any positive weight
attached to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect.
4.2 Partial collusion
We now turn to the case of partial collusion. We denote as bqCOP the quantity
at which the most intense level of collusion takes place for any  2  0; OP .
By solving (24-25) w.r.t. bqCOP and qOP , we obtain:
bqCOP = (a  c  g)
h
(3  2z)2   4  2z2   5z + 2i
(3  2z)3 ; (34)
qOP =
(a  c  g)
h
(3  2z)2 + 4  2z2   5z + 2i
(3  2z)3 : (35)
We control for the nonnegativity of bqCOP and qOP : Starting from bqCOP , since
the denominator is surely positive, any z 2 [1=2; 1] gives 4  2z2   5z + 2 <
0 and thus su¢ ces to yield bqCOP > 0: Otherwise, for all z 2 [0; 1=2) ; we havebqCOP ? 0 for all  7 (3  2z)2 =4  2z2   5z + 2 : However,
(3  2z)2
4 (2z2   5z + 2) > 
OP 8 z 2 [0; 1=2) : (36)
5Trivially, in this case condition (28) is slack as ~OP = 0 while ~ > 0:
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Consequently, bqCOP > 0 over the entire admissible region of parameters
f; zg :
Turning to qOP ; any z 2 [0; 1=2) gives 4  2z2   5z + 2 > 0 and thus
su¢ ces to yield qOP > 0: Otherwise, for all z 2 [1=2; 1] ; we have qOP ? 0
for all  7   (3  2z)2 =4  2z2   5z + 2 :
We can now examine whether the continuation payo¤ from the punish-
ment onwards satises the security level constraint. For qOP > 0; each rm
discounted prot is:
~OP +
1X
t=1
()t ~ =
(a  c  g)2
h
(3  2z)4 + 82 (2  z) (1  2z)2   4 (2  z) (3  4z (2  z))2
i
(1  ) (3  2z)6 :
(37)
Being both (a  c  g)2 and the denominator positive, we focus our attention
on:
 = (3  2z)4 + 82 (2  z) (1  2z)2   4 (2  z) (3  4z (2  z))2 ; (38)
which is quadratic in . It can be easily shown (although we omit details for
brevity) that  = 0 has no real roots for any z 2 [0; 1] : Therefore, (37) is
positive, and the security level condition is slack. The same of course holds
in the case in which qOP = 0:
We are now in a position to determine whether z and g have a pro or
anti-competitive e¤ect. The partial derivative of qOC w.r.t. z yields:
@bqCOP
@z
=
2 (a  c  g)
h
(3  2z)2   2  4z2   8z + 3i
(3  2z)4 : (39)
To evaluate its sign, note rst that 2 (a  c  g), (3  2z)2 and the denomi-
nator of the above fraction are positive, while  2  4z2   8z + 3 is concave
in z; with 4z2   8z + 3 = 0 at z =
 
2p7 =2 with z  < 0 and z+ > 1
always. This proves that @bqOC=@z > 0 over the entire admissible region of
parameters f; zg ; implying:
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Lemma 5 Under partial collusion and optimal punishment, increasing the
weight attached to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect.
The impact of g on collusion remains to be analysed. The partial deriv-
ative of bqCOP w.r.t. g yields:
@bqCOP
@g
=
4
 
2z2   5z + 2  (3  2z)2
(3  2z)3 : (40)
Since the denominator is surely positive, any z > 1=2 su¢ ces to yield
@bqCOP =@g < 0: Otherwise, for all z 2 [0; 1=2) ; we have @bqCOP =@g ? 0 for
all  ? (3  2z)2 =4  2z2   5z + 2 : However,
(3  2z)2
4 (2z2   5z + 2) > 
OP 8z 2 [0; 1=2) : (41)
Consequently, @bqCOP =@g < 0 over the entire admissible region of parameters
f; zg ; therefore an increase in g lowers the maximum quantity allowing for
a partial collusion, implying:
Lemma 6 With partial collusion and optimal punishment, to internalise
the environmental externality has an anti-competitive e¤ect on the market.
Lemma 5 and 6 show that, with optimal penal code, the e¤ect of z and
g on competition are consistent to their e¤ect with grim trigger strategies.
5 Welfare appraisal
The bottom line of the foregoing analysis is that the weights g and z attached
to the environmental externality and consumer surplus have opposite e¤ects
on industry output under partial collusion. This, in turn, has to be assessed
in combination with the fact that any increase (resp., decrease) in the output
level causes a decrease (resp., increase) in prots and the externality, and
an increase (resp., decrease) in consumer surplus. Hence, it is interesting to
construct a measure telling how these two parameters should be combined
so as to deliver a constant welfare level.
13
To this purpose, we write the total di¤erential of the individual collusive
output bqCJ ; J = N;OP; w.r.t. g and z :
dbqCJ = @bqCJ@g dg + @bqCJ@z dz (42)
and impose dbqCJ = 0 to obtain the marginal rate of substitution between z
and g :
dz
dg
=  @bqCJ
@g
=
@bqCJ
@z
> 0 (43)
always, as @bqCJ =@g and @bqCJ =@z have opposite sign irrespective of the type
of punishment being used. Accordingly, g and z are complements, i.e., any
increase in either one must go along with an increase in the other in order for
the output to remain constant. In such a case, obviously, also the resulting
welfare level remains constant at
SW = 2(a  bqCJ   c  1)bqCJ : (44)
Finally, observe that the slope of the associated isoquant is
@ (dz=dg)
@g
> 0; (45)
again irrespective of the nature of punishment (the detailed proof of this
result is in the appendix). This means that any increase in g must be
accompanied by a more than proportional increase in z. This is seemingly
due to the linear form of the externality function and the quadratic form of
consumer surplus.
6 Concluding remarks
We have examined a duopoly with negative environmental externalities in
which rms incorporate CSR into their objective functions, to investigate
the e¤ects of CSR on the stability/intensity of collusion. To do so, we have
modelled a supergame alternatively allowing for both full or partial col-
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lusion, the deterrence being based either on grim trigger strategies or on
optimal punishments. Our results suggest that, irrespective of the structure
of the punishment phase, assigning a weight to consumer surplus has a pro-
competitive e¤ect, i.e., either increases the threshold level of the discount
factor (under full collusion) or increases the output level (under partial col-
lusion). On the contrary, the presence of the environmental externality in
the objective function has an anti-competitive e¤ect, again independently
of the nature of the punishment, under partial collusion, and no e¤ect at
all under full collusion. The welfare analysis under partial collusion reveals
the presence of complementarity between the weghts attached to consumer
surplus and pollution.
References
[1] Abreu, D.J. 1986. External Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames.
Journal of Economic Theory 39: 191-225.
[2] Abreu, D.J. 1988. On the theory of innitely repeated games with dis-
counting. Econometrica 56: 383-396.
[3] Arora, S. and Gangopadhyay, S. 1995. Toward a Theoretical Model of
Voluntary Overcompliance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi-
zation 28: 289-309.
[4] Bagnoli, M. and Watts, S. 2003. Selling to Socially Responsible Con-
sumers: Competition and the Private Provision of Public Goods. Jour-
nal of Economic Management and Strategy 12: 419-445.
[5] Baron, D. 2001. Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and
Integrated Strategy. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
10: 7-45.
[6] Baron, D.P. and Diermeier, D. (ed.). 2007. Special Issue on Nonmarket
Strategy and Social Responsibility. Journal of Economics and Manage-
ment Strategy, 16, Issue 3.
15
[7] Baron, D.P. 2009. A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social
Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance. Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 18: 7-43.
[8] Benabou, R. and Tirole, J. 2010. Individual and Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility. Economica 77: 1-19.
[9] Benchekroun, H. and Van Long, N. 1998. E¢ ciency Inducing Taxation
for Polluting Oligopolists. Journal of Public Economics 70: 325-342.
[10] Benchekroun, H. and Van Long, N. 2002. On the Multiplicity of E¢ -
ciency Inducing Tax Rules. Economics Letters 76: 331-336.
[11] Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. 2010. Retailing Public Goods: The Eco-
nomics of Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of Public Economics
91: 1645-1663.
[12] Brekke, K. A. and Nyborg, K. 2008. Attracting Responsible Employees:
Green production as Labor Market Screening. Resource and Energy
Economics 30: 509-526.
[13] Chatterji, A.K., Levine, D. I. and To¤el, M.W. 2009. How Well Do So-
cial Ratings Actually Measure Corporate Social Responsibility? Jour-
nal of Economics and Management Strategy 18: 125-169.
[14] Damania, D. 1996. Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an
Oligopoly Supergame. Journal of Environmental Economics and Man-
agement 30: 323-336.
[15] Dockner, E.J, Jørgensen, S., Long, N.V. and Sorger, G. 2000. Di¤eren-
tial Games in Economics and Management Science. Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
[16] Ecchia, G. and Lambertini, L. 1997. Minimum Quality Standards and
Collusion. Journal of Industrial Economics 45: 101-113.
[17] Fernández-Kranz D. and Santaló, J. 2010. When Necessity Becomes
a Virtue: The E¤ect of Product Market Competition on Corporate
16
Social Responsibility. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
19: 453-487.
[18] Friedman, J. 1971. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. The
Review of Economic Studies 38: 1-12.
[19] Garcia-Gallego, A. and Georgantzís, N. 2009. Market E¤ects of Changes
in ConsumersSocial Responsibility. Journal of Economics and Manage-
ment Strategy, 19: 453-487.
[20] Kotchen, M. 2006. Green Markets and Private Provision of Public
Goods. Journal of Political Economy 114: 816-834.
[21] Lambertini, L. and Tampieri, A. 2010. Corporate Social Responsibility
in a Mixed Oligopoly. Department of Economics, University of Bologna
Working Papers 723.
[22] Lambertini, L. and Tampieri, A. 2011. On the stability of mixed
oligopoly equilibria with CSR rms. Department of Economics, Uni-
versity of Bologna Working Papers 768.
[23] Lundgren, T. 2007. On the Economics of Corporate Responsibility. Sus-
tainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers 3.
[24] Manasakis, C., Mitrokostas, E. and Petrakis, E. 2011. Corporate Social
Responsibility in Oligopoly. Department of Economics, University of
Crete Working Papers 0707.
Appendix
Consider the Nash punishment. The partial derivative of
dz
dg
=  @bqCN
@g
=
@bqCN
@z
(46)
w.r.t. g is:
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@ (dz=dg)
@g
=
(3  2z)
h
(3  2z)2   
i 
2z (6  5)  9 + 5   4z2 (1  )
2 (a  c  g)2
n
22 [5  2z (3  z)]  (3  2z)4    (3  2z)2 [4z (2  z) + 1]
o :
(47)
Take the numerator rst:
(3  2z)
h
(3  2z)2   
i
> 0 (48)
always, while:
2z (6  5)  9 + 5   4z2 (1  ) < 0 (49)
over the admissible parameter range, because the roots the above expression
are:
z =
6  5 p (5   4)
4 (1  ) (50)
which are imaginary for  2 (0; 4=5) and larger than one for  2 (4=5; 1) :
As to the denominator, observe that the coe¢ cient of 2 is always positive,
and then solve
22 [5  2z (3  z)]  (3  2z)4    (3  2z)2 [4z (2  z) + 1] = 0 (51)
to obtain
 =
(3  2z)2

1 + 8z   4z2 p41  32z + 72z2   64z3 + 16z4

4 (2z2   6z + 5) ; (52)
both outside the unit interval. This proves that the isoquant is convex w.r.t.
g when the innite Nash reversion is used to stabilise the cartel.
We turn now to optimal punishments. The partial derivative of
dz
dg
=  @bqCOP
@g
=
@bqCOP
@z
(53)
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w.r.t. g is:
@ (dz=dg)
@g
=  
(3  2z)
h
4 (2  z) (1  2z)  (3  2z)2
i
2 (a  c  g)2
h
2 (3 + 4z (2  z)) + (3  2z)2
i : (54)
The denominator is clearly positive, while the numerator has
4 (2  z) (1  2z)  (3  2z)2 < 0
for all z 2 (1=2; 1] : If instead z 2 (0; 1=2] ; the above condition is satised
for all
 <
(3  2z)2
(2  z) (1  2z) (55)
but the RHS is always higher than one. Therefore the isoquant is convex
w.r.t. g also when optimal punishments are adopted.
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